The Strategy

The Case for a Canadian Democracy Coalition

From 58 Organizations

Joneslee Consulting (formerly Steve S.J. Lee Consulting) | April 2026

Supported by the Catherine Donnelly Foundation and the Euphrosine Foundation

Co-designed with: Sam Reusch (Apathy is Boring), Niamh Leonard (Euphrosine Foundation), Amanda Munday (New Majority), Mason Ducharme (Centre for First Nations Governance), John Beebe (Democratic Engagement Exchange, TMU), Robin Prest (SFU Morris J. Wosk Centre for Dialogue)

⏱ 17 min read


A note on what this is. Over 7 months, 58 organizations across Canada's democracy sector and adjacent fields gave us their diagnosis, their frustrations, and their proposals. This is the analyst's curation of what they proposed: selected, grouped, and sequenced into a strategy. It is editorial judgment, and it should be read as such. The full inventory of 174 proposals that interviewees made appears in Appendix C. The detailed findings, tensions, and analytical framework that underpin these recommendations appear in the companion analysis, The Evidence. Everything in this strategy traces to what interviewees actually said. Nothing has been invented.


Why a Coalition

The strategy proposed here is: build a broad, nonpartisan ecosystem of organizations that depend on democratic conditions, with a dedicated coordination entity at its centre, and use that ecosystem to launch issue-specific coalitions, secure sustainable funding, and shift Canada's democratic culture from something people take for granted to something people actively maintain.

That strategy emerges from what 58 organizations told us. They include NGO directors and foundation heads, journalists, human rights commissioners, Indigenous governance leaders, academics, a former leader of the Official Opposition, and a constitutional lawyer. They span the ideological spectrum and work in every region. Some have devoted decades to this work; others arrived in Canada as exiles from countries where democracy collapsed.

42 of 58, without any prompting, described a sector that is fragmented, isolated, and unprepared. Not 1 person disagreed. 40 unprompted raised funding scarcity, not as "we need more money" but as a structural condition threatening the sector's survival. 35 unprompted expressed a desire for collaboration. These are the 3 highest-frequency findings in the entire exercise, and together they constitute a clear mandate: the sector cannot meet the challenges it faces as a collection of isolated organizations competing for the same small pool of funding. It needs shared infrastructure, shared strategy, and shared voice.

"A couple of people in a very tiny dinghy in the middle of a big storm in the middle of the ocean."
"I picture a jigsaw puzzle that has been partially put together, but all the pieces are there... but they're not put together yet."

15 unprompted named the collapse of the information ecosystem as an existential threat. 7 named complacency as the sector's deepest vulnerability, with the sharpest warnings coming from people who have lived through democratic collapse elsewhere. Others named the attraction of authoritarian models, the spillover effects of U.S. democratic crisis, and the weaponization of information. The gap between the scale of these threats and the capacity of 30 to 50 democracy NGOs to respond to them is the core strategic problem. 16 unprompted called for a multi-sector approach, recognizing that the organizations that currently identify as democracy NGOs are too small for the challenge. The coalition must involve adjacent sectors: journalism, human rights, Indigenous governance, civic education, arts, municipal government.

"We need to match the boldness and sense of urgency and ambitions that authoritarian forces bring."
"We lost our country because of that."

A coalition is what makes this possible. No single organization can coordinate a sector, reform how it gets funded, build a shared public narrative, and engage the communities it has not yet reached. A coalition can.


Why Now

Three conditions create urgency.

The will is there. 35 of 58 organizations unprompted expressed a desire for collaboration. This is a rare moment where the great majority of people in a community want to talk to each other, listen to each other, and work together. That does not happen all the time. The sector's will is coalescing, and this window must be seized before the urgency fades or the conditions that created it change. At the same time, the sector's institutional capacity is eroding: at least 3 organizations are reducing to part-time operations, U.S. funding has been eliminated, and experienced practitioners are leaving the field because it cannot sustain them.

"Some organizations are literally facing a moment where they have no funding, and they are at risk of going down... at the risk of losing a lot of institutional knowledge."

Peer democracies are already acting. Canada's allies have begun treating democratic resilience as a national security priority. The European Union's Democracy Shield provides coordinated support for civil society and democratic infrastructure, with the European Commission proposing 9 billion euros over 7 years. At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, allies committed to investing 5% of GDP annually on core defence and security-related spending by 2035, with up to 1.5% of GDP allocated to protect critical infrastructure, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, and strengthen the defence industrial base. Canada's democracy sector has no equivalent coordination, no equivalent public investment, and no equivalent framework for treating democratic infrastructure as essential.

Canada is in the preparatory window. The Carnegie Endowment's research on democratic recovery identifies a consistent pattern across successful cases: broad, cross-ideological coalitions organized around democratic principles, built before the acute crisis. Brazil's Pacto pela Democracia grew from a research project into a coalition of 200+ organizations because the relationship-building happened first. South Korea's candlelight movement drew on decades of civil society infrastructure. Senegal's 2024 democratic transition succeeded because a pre-existing coalition of election monitors and civic organizations was already in place. In every case, someone did the preparatory work before the moment demanded action. Canada has that opportunity now. The question is whether the sector will use it.


The Landscape

What does the Canadian democracy sector look like today? The listening exercise revealed that people answer this question differently depending on what they need.

"Who exists? What do they do? Where do I fit?"

Directory problem

The Canadian Democracy Atlas, an interactive online tool mapping 100+ organizations by type, scope, and area of focus, is a first step toward answering it.

Explore the Atlas →

Where Should You Start?

Different readers need different entry points. Select your role to get a guided path through the site.

Select your role above to see a recommended reading path.

Six Priority Action Areas

From findings across 58 organizations. Click a wedge to explore.

35Establish aCoalitionSecretariat40Increase andRestructureFunding10Develop theSharedNarrative16Form Issue-SpecificCoalitions7+Build aCoalition LikeCanada10Invest inDemocraticCultureTHECONVENINGstarts here

Click or hover over a wedge to see details.

Strengthen the Core (3 areas)
Broaden the Coalition (2 areas)
Shift the Culture (1 area)

Six priority action areas derived from 58 organizations, organized by the 3 concentric circles. Numbers indicate organizations that unprompted raised each theme. The convening is the proposed first step from which all action areas proceed.

A note on what this coalition is not proposing. It is not proposing that all organizations agree on policy positions. It is not proposing another layer of bureaucracy. It is not proposing to replicate work that organizations are already doing well on their own. And it is not proposing that participation requires ideological alignment. The coalition's value lies in what it makes possible that no organization can achieve alone: shared infrastructure, coordinated action, and a public voice that matches the scale of the challenge.

"The sector is going to maintain its strength the more it serves the people. The more it serves the sector, the more that thing is just gonna die."

What the Coalition Should Do

1. Establish a Coalition Secretariat

The most broadly supported proposal in the entire listening exercise is coordination infrastructure: a dedicated entity that provides regular convening, shared information, and operational coordination. 35 of 58 unprompted expressed desire for collaboration. 14 identified the need for a shared framework. 10 named complementarity over competition as a priority. The preferred model is hub-and-spoke rather than centralized: a lightweight core that connects nodes of activity without controlling them. Climate Action Network Canada was the most frequently cited structural analogue.

1.1 Create a dedicated coordination entity

The secretariat should be a registered, independently governed organization with its own funding. Its role is to serve as the standing infrastructure for the coalition: convening the ecosystem, supporting issue-specific coalitions when they form, maintaining shared tools, and ensuring that coordination is someone's dedicated job rather than something done off the side of already-stretched desks. Proposals for this entity ranged from a hosted secretariat within an existing organization to a fully independent new entity. The evidence supports independence: a coordination function housed inside an existing organization risks being perceived as that organization's project rather than as shared infrastructure.

1.2 Organize regular convenings and strategy sessions

Proposals included monthly or bimonthly virtual coordination calls, annual in-person strategy sessions, and working retreats. The first national in-person convening, using this strategy as a working document for discussion, is the proposed starting point for the coalition. Annual strategy sessions should produce tangible outputs: an updated shared strategic framework, a small set of joint priorities for the next cycle, and clear identification of where capacity is thin. Brazil's Pacto pela Democracia offers a precedent: it began as a research project building relationships, and when the political crisis demanded action, the relational infrastructure was already in place and the coalition grew to more than 200 organizations. The sequence mattered: relationships first, then action.

1.3 Build shared tools and infrastructure

The secretariat should maintain a shared organizational directory (the Canadian Democracy Atlas is a first step, proposed unprompted by 10 interviewees), a communications listserv, shared services that reduce costs for member organizations, and a shared database of funded initiatives so organizations and funders can see the landscape. Several interviewees proposed a shared-services model inspired by 401 Richmond, where co-located organizations share administrative functions.

1.4 Enable joint strategy and rapid response

Beyond routine coordination, the secretariat should support joint action: brokering introductions between organizations that should be collaborating, coordinating joint funding applications, commissioning shared research on democratic health indicators, and operating a consent-based rapid response mechanism for moments when democratic norms are threatened and the sector needs to be louder than any single organization can be alone. The governance of collective voice, who it speaks for, how opt-in works, and when silence is the right answer, is itself a design question the first convening should address.


2. Increase and Restructure Democracy Funding

40 unprompted raised funding scarcity as a structural condition, making it the second most consistent finding in the dataset. But the proposals that emerged go well beyond "we need more money." They diagnose a funding system that is itself part of the problem, and they propose both fixing the system and growing the pool.

2.1 Shift funding from project-based to multi-year core support

11 unprompted named the structural damage of project-based funding versus core mission support. Funders invest in time-limited projects with defined outputs; organizations need sustained operational capacity to exist between projects. The result is a sector that spends as much energy chasing grants as doing its work, that cannot retain experienced staff because it cannot guarantee ongoing positions, and that structures itself around funder priorities rather than democratic needs. 5 unprompted named funders' innovation bias: the preference for new programs over sustaining proven ones. 4 named philanthropy's risk aversion and preoccupation with optics. The reform is specific: multi-year collaborative funding, pooled application models, and funding conditions that require collaboration rather than merely rewarding it. The coalition should identify 3 to 5 funders willing to pilot multi-year core mission funding within the first year.

2.2 Convene a funder coordination table

6 interviewees called for a funder coordination table modeled on Environment Funders Canada, where foundations investing in democracy can share intelligence, align strategies, and reduce duplication. The listening exercise uncovered a "privacy culture" among Canadian funders that prevents coordination. Multiple funders described an environment where foundations cannot see each other's investments, cannot articulate to their boards why democracy is a distinct funding priority, and cannot coordinate entry and exit timing to prevent the boom-and-bust cycles that destabilize grantees. The funder coordination table replaces this privacy culture with transparency. It should be convened within 3 months.

2.3 Grow the funding pool

The current funding pool for democracy work in Canada is a fraction of what comparable sectors receive, and a fraction of what peer democracies invest. 4 unprompted named the scale gap between Canadian and U.S. funding for comparable work. The solution is not only to restructure existing funding but to create more of it. This means courting new funders into the democracy space, which is partly why the funder coordination table matters: it provides a venue for existing democracy funders to invite peers who have not yet recognized democracy as a funding priority.

It also means government investment. The concept of a Canadian democracy endowment, providing durable, arm's-length public funding for democracy work, has evolved since interviewees first raised it. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) is currently studying a proposal for $100 million in public funding over 5 years. Several interviewees in this exercise have appeared as witnesses before that committee. The international precedent is clear: the European Union's Democracy Shield proposes 9 billion euros over 7 years for democratic resilience. NATO allies have committed to allocating up to 1.5% of GDP to civil preparedness and resilience, including protecting democratic infrastructure. Canada should match its allies' recognition that democratic resilience is a national priority that requires public investment.

Policy advocacy and lobbying government for increased democracy funding came up repeatedly across the interviews. This is work the sector should do collectively, through the coalition, rather than organization by organization.

2.4 Build transparency among funders

The "privacy culture" is specific and addressable. Funders should share what they are funding, coordinate their timelines, and jointly assess where the sector's greatest funding risks are. A rapid sector risk assessment should be conducted immediately to identify which organizations are most at risk of permanent closure and what emergency bridge funding is needed. The funder coordination table is the venue for this transparency.


3. Develop the Shared Narrative

10 unprompted identified the need for a shared story about what democracy work is and why it matters. The sector cannot explain itself to the public. It cannot articulate what it does, why it matters, or what it accomplishes. This is a strategic vulnerability. A sector that cannot tell its own story cannot attract public support, cannot recruit the next generation of practitioners, and cannot defend itself when its work is characterized by others.

3.1 Define what democracy work is and why it matters

The narrative should be strengths-based: not "democracy is under threat" as a permanent emergency, but "democratic infrastructure is what makes everything else possible." The proposals that emerged converge on a story that connects democracy to what people already care about: the quality of their schools, the safety of their communities, the responsiveness of their institutions. Anti-democratic movements understand this connection intuitively and recruit accordingly. The democracy sector has not yet found language that does the same.

The narrative development process itself should be cross-partisan, drawing input from across the political spectrum rather than from within the sector alone. The narrative should be tested with audiences outside the sector, particularly conservative democrats and adjacent-sector leaders, before it is finalized.

3.2 Position the work as political, not partisan

16 unprompted identified the conflation of progressive politics with democracy work as a credibility problem for the sector. This is the sector's own self-assessment, raised without prompting by people who work within it. The data points toward nonpartisan positioning: defending democratic norms regardless of which party threatens them. This is distinct from bipartisan positioning, which implies the sector exists to broker compromise between parties. Democracy work is inherently political, concerning the distribution and exercise of power. It need not be partisan, meaning aligned with a particular party or ideological camp. The sector's challenge is that it has conflated these 2 things. Its work is political, and it should be. But its institutional culture, its language, and its networks read as partisan, and that narrows its effectiveness. (For the full evidence on this question, see Finding 4 in The Evidence.)

3.3 Form a narrative coalition to coordinate year-round communications

Developing a shared narrative and communicating it are 2 different but related tasks. The narrative coalition is itself an issue-specific coalition (see action area 4): it should bring together communications practitioners, researchers, and leaders from across the political spectrum to develop, test, and sustain a year-round public presence that makes the case for democratic infrastructure. The sector currently peaks in visibility during election periods and disappears between them. Anti-democratic movements, by contrast, maintain constant presence and recruit continuously. A communications coordination function, even an informal one, would allow organizations to amplify shared messages without requiring uniformity.

The narrative work connects directly to action area 6 (Invest in Democratic Culture). Action area 3 is about defining what the sector says. Action area 6 is about building the conditions where that message lands: civic education, democracy between elections, and belonging as democratic infrastructure.


4. Form Issue-Specific Coalitions

The listening exercise surfaced a distinction that proved to be among its most durable contributions: the difference between an ecosystem and a coalition. An ecosystem is broad, inclusive, and relational. It connects organizations that share democratic conditions as a foundation for their work, without requiring agreement on priorities or strategy. A coalition is narrower, purpose-built, and time-limited. It forms around a specific issue and includes whoever has standing on that issue, regardless of whether they identify as a "democracy organization."

4.1 Use the ecosystem/coalition distinction as the operating model

This distinction resolves a tension that ran through the interviews. 16 unprompted called for a multi-sector approach. 11 framed democracy as a process or system, not as an issue or outcome. If democracy is the operating system on which other sectors run, then journalism, human rights, municipal innovation, and civic education are not adjacent to democracy work. They depend on it. And the democracy sector depends on them.

The ecosystem holds the broad coalition. Issue-specific coalitions operate as focused working groups within it. Each coalition is narrower than the ecosystem, focused on a specific ask, and open to organizations with standing on the issue. This is how the broad aspiration becomes operational without requiring everyone to agree on everything. The ecosystem is the relational infrastructure that makes these coalitions possible. The coalitions are the action vehicles that give the ecosystem purpose.

4.2 Launch coalitions around concrete, shared problems

The listening exercise surfaced at least 5 natural coalition opportunities:

An anti-hate coalition could connect organizations working on civil liberties, Indigenous rights, gender-based violence, and hate speech around shared threats to the legal and constitutional frameworks they all depend on.

An online harms coalition could unite children's health organizations, anti-hate groups, journalism advocates, and digital rights organizations around platform accountability.

An information ecosystem coalition could address the crisis that 15 unprompted identified as existential: local news deserts, algorithmic manipulation, and the collapse of shared information infrastructure.

A press freedom and local journalism coalition could unite journalism organizations, journalism schools, public broadcasting advocates, and digital rights groups around the information infrastructure that democratic life requires.

A civic education coalition could bring together formal education actors (school boards, faculties of education), informal educators (libraries, community centres, youth organizations), and digital literacy practitioners around building democratic competency across the lifespan.

Each of these coalitions would draw on the relational ecosystem but form around concrete problems with specific asks and specific timelines. The coalition secretariat (action area 1) would support their formation and coordination. The first year should pilot 1 issue-specific coalition, learning from the process before scaling.


5. Build a Coalition That Looks Like Canada

The listening exercise asked interviewees to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10, how likely they would be to recommend that someone they care about get involved in the Canadian democracy sector. The answers revealed what we call the insider-outsider gap. Among the 27 core sector leaders who answered, enthusiasm was high. Among the 20 people from adjacent fields, journalism, human rights, Indigenous governance, and others, enthusiasm dropped to zero. Not because they doubt the importance of the work, but because they see a sector that cannot sustain the people who do it. The people the coalition most needs to reach are the ones least convinced it would serve them.

The gap is not a data point. It is a warning. If the coalition's first act is to gather the people already in the room, it will reproduce the insularity that this exercise documented. (For the full evidence on the gap, see Finding 6 in The Evidence.)

5.1 Invite conservative democratic voices

7 unprompted raised the need to include conservative voices. Only 2 of 58 brought explicitly conservative perspectives, and both confirmed the sector's progressive orientation from the outside. Both said they would participate in sector conversations if invited. Both brought substantive democratic concerns the rest of the sample had largely ignored: judicial appointments, independence of the judiciary, concentration of power in the Prime Minister's Office, algorithmic threats to free expression. They did not need to be persuaded that democracy matters. They needed to be asked.

The sector's failure is not that it holds progressive values. It is that it has not extended invitations to people who share its commitment to democratic institutions but not its policy preferences. The fix is not messaging. It is who is in the room and what issues the coalition takes up.

5.2 Centre Indigenous governance leadership

The 3 Indigenous-led organizations in the sample, representing distinct vantage points, all unprompted positioned reconciliation as central to democratic renewal. But their critique goes deeper than inclusion. 1 interviewee described the sector's unexamined liberalism, its focus on individuality, growth, and inclusion as philosophical commitments, as a form of tunnel vision that prevents recognizing governance traditions that predate the liberal democratic framework.

"There has to be room in the movement for democracy to include those that are more assertive, that argue for contention, that challenge the very rules the game is played by."

The coalition should treat the Indigenous governance critique as a challenge to the framework itself, not as an addition to an existing structure. This means more than inviting Indigenous voices to existing tables. It means rethinking what the tables look like.

5.3 Reach the communities the sector has not yet engaged

Of 58 interviewees, only 1 brought a francophone perspective. Alberta and Saskatchewan are virtually unrepresented. Frontline communities are talked about but represented by no one. The exercise mapped the network as it exists. The coalition must include the people the network has not yet reached. Specific actions: extend 10 invitations to people and organizations not currently in the network, prioritizing conservative democrats, Indigenous governance leaders, and francophone organizations. Commission a francophone listening exercise to fill the most significant gap in the current evidence base.

5.4 Create entry points for adjacent-sector leaders

The insider-outsider gap tells us that the things depressing adjacent-sector enthusiasm are structural, not motivational: funding precarity, career instability, insularity, and the perception that democracy work is a project of 1 ideological camp. These are not objections that better recruitment messaging can overcome. They are conditions that must change before the sector can credibly invite people to join it. Issue-specific coalitions (action area 4) are themselves entry points: a journalist joining an information ecosystem coalition does not need to adopt the sector's identity or attend its internal meetings. They participate because the issue matters to their work.


6. Invest in Democratic Culture

The listening exercise began with "How do we coordinate?" and ended with "How do we build a Canada where democratic resilience is a cultural condition, not just an institutional arrangement?" That trajectory is itself a finding. The most sophisticated interviewees, particularly those from outside the sector, pushed the conversation beyond organizational plumbing toward the deeper question of what makes a democracy durable.

6.1 Coordinate civic education across the lifespan

10 unprompted named civic education as a sector-wide priority. The proposals go beyond school curricula: informal education in community spaces and libraries, digital literacy as a democratic competency, and structured pathways for young people to participate in democratic life outside electoral politics. Finland was cited as a model: a country that has embedded media literacy across its education system since the 1950s, treating it as a lifelong competency and producing a population consistently ranked among the most resistant to disinformation in Europe. A civic education coalition (see action area 4) could coordinate this work across organizations and jurisdictions.

6.2 Build democratic practice between elections

10 unprompted named the neglect of democracy between elections as a structural problem. The sector's work, funding, visibility, and narrative all peak around election periods and fade between them. 1 interviewee offered a metaphor that captures this precisely:

"Government is like your HVAC system. Government is that thing that makes the house safe and habitable... but there's a bunch of other things that need to happen as well to make that house a home."

Nobody notices their heating system until it breaks. Nobody thinks about democratic infrastructure until it fails. The sector's challenge is to make the case for year-round democratic maintenance in a culture that only pays attention during elections. Democratic innovation proposals, including citizens' assemblies and participatory budgeting (5 unprompted), offer models for what between-elections engagement looks like in practice.

6.3 Meet people where they are

7 unprompted named belonging as a core democratic value. 7 unprompted named youth and democracy as an underserved intersection. These findings are connected. People who feel they belong to a democratic community defend that community when it is threatened. People who experience democracy as an abstraction do not. Anti-democratic movements understand this: they go to where people already are, recruit in gyms, faith communities, and online spaces, and offer belonging before ideology. The democracy sector's model is largely passive: create events, publish reports, hope people show up.

"The extreme right is recruiting in the gyms. And I find this really interesting, because that's where they're finding men who are isolated, and looking to belong, and they're inviting them out."

The culture work in this action area connects directly to the narrative work in action area 3. Action area 3 defines what the sector says. This action area builds the conditions where that message lands: spaces where people experience democratic participation as part of their lives, not as an obligation they fulfill once every 4 years.


What Comes Next

This is a working strategy, not a finished plan. It is intended to be taken into a room, argued over, and improved by the people who will execute it.

The first step is the convening. Within 6 months, the coalition should organize a national in-person gathering of sector leaders, adjacent-sector voices, funders, and the communities currently missing from the conversation. This strategy and The Evidence should be the working documents for that gathering. The convening is where strategy becomes real: a plan of action built on relationships and commitments.

The Canadian Democracy Atlas should be distributed widely: use it to identify who should be in the room for the convening, who is missing, and where the network's blind spots are.

And 10 invitations should go out to people not currently in the network. Conservative democrats, Indigenous governance leaders, francophone organizations, and regional voices from Alberta, Saskatchewan, and frontline communities. These are structural corrections, not courtesy invitations.

The 6 co-designers of this listening exercise, Sam Reusch, Niamh Leonard, Amanda Munday, Mason Ducharme, John Beebe, and Robin Prest, have committed to organizing the first convening and to championing this strategy within their own organizations and networks. Their commitment is the first act of accountability in the coalition this strategy proposes.

58 people gave their time, their candour, and their trust to this process. What comes next is up to the people who participated, the funders who support them, and the Canadians whose democratic life depends on what they build.


The companion analysis, The Evidence: 10 Findings from 58 Organizations, provides the detailed analytical foundation for this strategy. Explore the Full Data contains the methodology, structured question responses, full initiative inventory (174 proposals), theme codebook, quote bank, and international comparisons.